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**UNIFIED ACTION: A BRIDGE TOO FAR?**

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**A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.**

**Signature: \_\_\_\_\_**

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## **Abstract**

### *Unified Action: A Bridge Too Far?*

The debate on how to establish unity-of-action for a given military operation has been growing in importance over the last forty years. This debate becomes even more poignant in today's world where operational commanders have an increased responsibility outside of normal war fighting functions. Political ramifications from working with interagency and international partners have changed the traditional military command and control dynamic and forced introspection on the joint principles driving United States military operations. The establishment of an operational command structure based solely on the principle of unity-of-command falls short of guaranteeing unity-of-effort. The joint force commander must understand the other organizations working in the area of operations and successfully coordinate and synchronize actions. Operational commanders must clearly align the operational command structure with the objectives to preclude mutual interference, establish coordination bodies and a network of liaisons to synchronize the effects of different entities, and educate all partners on organizational capabilities and limitations, to ensure the United States Government achieves unified action in complex interagency and international operations.

## **Introduction**

The debate on how to establish unity-of-action for a given military operation has been growing in importance over the last forty years. This debate becomes even more poignant in today's world where operational commanders have increased responsibilities outside normal war fighting functions. Political ramifications from working with interagency and international partners have changed the traditional military command and control dynamic and forced introspection on the joint principles driving United States military operations. The establishment of an operational command structure based solely on the principle of unity-of-command falls short of guaranteeing unity-of-effort. The joint force commander (JFC) must understand the other organizations working in the area of operations and successfully coordinate and synchronize actions. Operational commanders must clearly align the operational command structure with the objectives to preclude mutual interference, establish coordination bodies and a network of liaisons to synchronize the effects of different entities, and educate all partners on organizational capabilities and limitations, to ensure the United States Government achieves unified action in complex interagency and international operations.

## **Terms and Concepts**

According to Joint Publication 1-02, the term "joint" refers to "activities, operations, and organizations in which elements of two or more military departments participate."<sup>1</sup> This implies that joint operations are concerned with actions facilitated by multiple military services in a particular region. Though this definition is doctrinally correct, it does not convey the scope of what is expected of a modern JFC. According to the Quadrennial Defense Review, "Interagency

and international combined operations truly are the new Joint Operations.”<sup>2</sup> “Joint” effectively means all entities that contribute to solving the problem.

The broader definition of joint operations given by the Quadrennial Defense Review is similar to the definition the Department of Defense gives to unified action. According to Joint Publication 5-0, to accomplish unified action, the national civilian or military leaders must ensure the “synchronization and/or integration of joint or multinational military operations with the activities of local, state, and federal government agencies and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations.”<sup>3</sup> To do this, the commander must have the authority to establish unity-of-command or coordinate between entities to achieve unity-of-effort.

The issue of authority is critical in understanding the method in which a joint force plans and executes operations. Joint Publication 1-02 states that command and control is “the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.”<sup>4</sup> Traditional command and control is an authority based process where an operational commander is delegated specific and limited authority to integrate and direct forces to accomplish a given mission. The use of the term command and control is usually associated with the principle of unity-of-command.

Unity-of-command is one of the twelve principles of joint operations listed in Joint Publication 3-0. The purpose of unity-of-command is to ensure unity-of-effort by providing the authority required to integrate and direct all forces assigned to the unified commander.<sup>5</sup> With the evolving requirements to conduct missions across the range of military operations, the requisite authority to command and control all military, governmental, and non-military actions in the commander’s area of operations is near impossible to attain. Due to the constitutional system of the United States, where separation of powers is central to how the people control government

actions, no one person is likely to be vested with operational authority over multiple agencies. As a result, the operational commander must attempt to establish a unified purpose with organizations falling outside of the commander's authority in order to synchronize actions toward a unity-of-effort.

When the authority to command and control is impossible to attain, operational commanders must shift to cooperation and coordination to achieve common U. S. government objectives. Cooperation between entities is usually based on mutual interests and often requires negotiation and compromise to achieve success.<sup>6</sup> Coordination is "the act of or process of orchestrating the actions of all available means to produce an agreeable or harmonious effect."<sup>7</sup> In essence, cooperation and coordination produces synchronized activities in comparison to the integrated activities produced by command and control. Cooperation and coordination are the foundations of unity-of-effort.

Unity-of-effort is the "coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization."<sup>8</sup> The critical element here is that the unified commander's authority does not apply to all organizations in the area of operations. Sometimes these organizations are part of the United States Government, such as the Department of State, and other times they are foreign or multi-national entities. Two of the most common multinational organizations are intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations.

Intergovernmental organizations, such as the United Nations, are established by formal agreement to promote the common interests of the national signatories.<sup>9</sup> These organizations vary in size, focus and capability. Elements of intergovernmental organizations might fall under

the JFC's authority in some situations, and in other situations the JFC may be subject to the authority of the intergovernmental organization.

Nongovernmental organizations (NGO) such as CARE are “private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization[s] dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society.”<sup>10</sup> These organizations can be organized as local, national, or international organizations and will not fall under the authority of military or governmental leaders.<sup>11</sup> Nongovernmental organizations frequently have different objectives than the joint force or government and are reluctant to coordinate with the military for fear of jeopardizing their neutrality status.<sup>12</sup>

### **Command Structure**

For most of history, the military's perspective on the best way to establish the integration element of unified action was to establish unity-of-command through clear lines of authority. With the focus on fighting and winning wars, the simplicity of an integrated command structure based on clear lines of authority improved information flow and enhanced control of the military effort. In World War II, there were multiple examples where unity-of-command produced stunning successes, and the failure to apply the principle almost lead to catastrophic defeats.

The principle of unity-of-command was used for multiple actions in the European Theater of Operations, including Operation *Overlord*, the invasion of France. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was selected as the Supreme Commander for the operation.<sup>13</sup> Subordinate to Eisenhower were three British officers, Admiral Sir Bertram H. Ramsay, Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Mallory, and General Sir Bernard Montgomery, who commanded the naval, air, and land components respectively.<sup>14</sup> Though there were challenges arising from the cultural



differences between the British and American officers, the integration of forces under a unified command structure greatly enhanced the overall combat effectiveness of the allies and lead to mission success.<sup>15</sup>

In the Pacific Theater of Operations, the principle of unity-of-command was disregarded during the Battle for Leyte Gulf. General Douglass MacArthur, the commander of the Southwest Pacific Area, was tasked to seize the Philippines from Japanese control.<sup>16</sup> Under MacArthur's command were separate land, air, and naval component commanders. Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, the naval component commander, commanded Seventh Fleet which was tasked to support the amphibious landings.<sup>17</sup> Admiral William F. "Bull" Halsey Jr., the commander of Third Fleet was also tasked to support the amphibious landing but did not report to General MacArthur.<sup>18</sup> Halsey reported directly to Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, the commander of the Pacific Ocean Areas who ordered Halsey to support the landings, but also to decisively defeat the Japanese Navy if the opportunity arose.<sup>19</sup> As a result, when Halsey was presented an opportunity to engage the Japanese carrier fleet, he seized the opportunity and left MacArthur's landing force exposed to a Japanese counterattack.<sup>20</sup> Although Halsey can be faulted for failing to adequately coordinate actions with Kinkaid or MacArthur, he should not be faulted for following a stated mission from Admiral Nimitz. Halsey's actions are arguably the product of a parallel command structure which confused the situation and lead to disunity. Admiral Halsey stated that a "united command structure" under a single commander would have ensured a more effective employment of the U. S. naval forces in the battle for Leyte Gulf.<sup>21</sup>

More recently, Operation *Joint Endeavor* encountered significant challenges in developing a clearly aligned command structure.<sup>22</sup> The multinational Implementation Force (IFOR), established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1031, incorporated thirty-

two nations and was tasked with peace enforcement operations in Bosnia.<sup>23</sup> The problem began with the Dayton Peace Agreement which established the framework for achieving peace, but did not appoint an overall unified commander to “synchronize the military, political and humanitarian aspects of the mission.”<sup>24</sup> The United Nations appointed a High Representative responsible for accomplishing the tasks framed by the peace agreement.<sup>25</sup> However, the appointment did not include the authority to integrate or direct, which resulted in an uncoordinated effort, especially among the civilian organizations in the region.<sup>26</sup>

The Dayton Peace Agreement also endorsed the establishment of the multinational Implementation Force, and transferred the authority for peace enforcement operations from the United Nations Protection Force to IFOR.<sup>27</sup> To command and control the force, the Commander of IFOR established a unified command structure under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.<sup>28</sup> The command architecture for IFOR was based on the lead nation design, but most of the participating nations remained under the command of their national authorities as well.<sup>29</sup> As a result, a parallel structure also existed. Rather than command and control under unity-of-command, the parallel structure required cooperation and coordination for unity-of-effort.

The limitations of a parallel structure manifested itself most acutely in the ground component where “national interest and interference prevented the commander from exercising this authority as formally as it was designed.”<sup>30</sup> As a result, it took time for tactics and orders to be vetted through the participating nation’s governing authorities, which adversely affected operational tempo and flexibility.<sup>31</sup> The inefficiency of IFOR’s parallel command structure coupled with the lack of synchronization among the civilian organizations lead to a stove-piped

organization which was not optimized for success. In effect, many of the tactical and operational decisions were moved to the national-political level.

The lines of authority can be more convoluted in operations such as a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO). During a NEO, the ambassador wields the authority and responsibility for the success of the operation.<sup>32</sup> Joint Publication 3-68 states, “Subject to the overall authority of the ambassador, responsibility for the conduct of military operations in support of an evacuation and security of personnel, equipment, and installations within the designated operational area is vested with the joint force commander.”<sup>33</sup> Doctrine gives the impression there is unity-of-command and the ambassador has command authority over the JFC. This view is mirrored by a Center of Naval Analysis NEO study which stated, “The command should impress on the officers who go into the Embassy that the Ambassador is in charge on the ground.”<sup>34</sup> Both of these statements conflict with other sources, to include the Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of State and Department of Defense on noncombatant evacuations.

The memorandum highlights that “the military commander is solely responsible for operations” but should operate “under the policies established by the principle U. S. Diplomat or consular representative.”<sup>35</sup> The memorandum implies that the Ambassador does not have authority over the operational commander and the JFC and the Ambassador must act under separate authorities and coordinate based on unity-of-effort. Chapter one of Joint Publication 3-68 is more succinct and states, “The ambassador is not in the military chain of command, but as the senior U. S. official on scene, is responsible for the [noncombatant evacuation operation] and protection of U. S. citizens, citizens of the [host nation], or [third country nationals] who have been designated for evacuation. It is imperative that the ambassador’s evacuation plan and the

[joint force commander's] plan for the [noncombatant evacuation operation] be supportive, coordinated, and fully integrated."<sup>36</sup> The key issue is that different sources imply different command authorities making it difficult to determine a clear and simple command structure. As a result, both the JFC and the Ambassador must consult and agree on a common objective to ensure unity of action.

During Operation *Eastern Exit*, the NEO from Somalia, the JFC and the Ambassador strived to enhance cooperation and coordination. Both the Ambassador and the JFC understood their roles, responsibilities, and authority during the planning and execution of the evacuation.<sup>37</sup> The Ambassador was proactive in providing guidance to the country team which facilitated planning, and clearly stated his intent to commanders on the ground during execution.<sup>38</sup> Though the JFC was not under the Ambassador's authority, the commander did understand that cooperation was required to effectively accomplish the mission. When a Marine sniper team came under fire, the Ambassador's directive on the use of deadly force was upheld by the commander on the ground and the Marines moved to a safer location instead of engaging the perpetrators.<sup>39</sup> The result of this cooperation was a successful evacuation with no military or civilian casualties.<sup>40</sup> Operation *Eastern Exit* is a success story, but that was mainly due to the personalities involved in the operation. If the Ambassador and the on-scene commander were less knowledgeable of NEOs or had failed to cooperate as thoroughly, the operation could have produced adverse diplomatic results and human casualties.

### **Coordinating Bodies**

Today's commanders are required to execute missions across the range of military operations, forcing them to perform in non-combat roles. These roles are generally at the low end of the force spectrum and require coordination with new organizations. Though past

generations were reluctant, modern military commanders are required to coordinate with the interagency, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and foreign partners.<sup>41</sup> The National Security Strategy notes that to defeat the terrorist threat in Afghanistan the United States Government would “continue to work with international organizations such as the United Nations, as well as non-governmental organizations, and other countries to provide the humanitarian, political, economic, and security assistance necessary to rebuild Afghanistan.”<sup>42</sup>

The National Military Strategy echoes this call by adopting an “active defense-in-depth that merges joint force, interagency, international non-governmental organizations, and multinational capabilities in a synergistic manner.”<sup>43</sup> The reluctance of military commanders to negotiate military objectives may contribute to a lack of unified action across the full spectrum of national and international partners.<sup>44</sup> Negotiating objectives has been a considerable challenge, not only internationally, but among the elements of the United States Government. National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44) is a significant step in addressing this problem at the strategic level. NSPD-44 directs the Department of State to “coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.”<sup>45</sup>

One way commanders at the operational level are attempting to overcome resistance while building capacity is by establishing joint interagency coordination groups (JIACG).<sup>46</sup> The organizational element is designed to enhance communication and coordination between military and civilian planners to facilitate cooperation.<sup>47</sup> This coordination group, established by a geographic combatant commander, is essentially an open forum where issues, ideas, and

challenges can be discussed. The JIACG does not have the authority to task or execute actions but is an important element for facilitating communication and coordination essential to unified action.<sup>48</sup>

Currently, a standing JIACG has been established at each combatant command, but additional JIACGs can be created depending on the requirements. General John Abizaid stated, “Close cooperation with our interagency and international partners is an important element of success . . . Our Joint Interagency Coordination Group within the headquarters is an example of this new wave of integration.”<sup>49</sup> According to the after-action report for Exercise *Terminal Fury* ’05, the JIACG, “Became a valuable “place to go” to get information and a clearinghouse for discussing and vetting policy and operational options.”<sup>50</sup>

Though the JIACG serves the combatant commander as a coordination tool, the combatant commander can also form either a joint task force (JTF) or a joint interagency task force (JIATF) to execute actions. The JTF is a command established under a single commander for a specific mission.<sup>51</sup> When problems demand an interagency solution, a JIATF can be established. The command is modeled after the JIACG and integrates personnel from multiple agencies for a specific common purpose. These missions range from anti-drug operations conducted by Joint Interagency Task Force South to homeland security conducted by Joint Interagency Homeland Security Task Force.<sup>52</sup> The JIATF leverages organizational structure to enhance communication and cooperation at the operational level. The greater interaction in a JIATF fosters an environment where trust and understanding can thrive.

Once a JTF is established, the JFC can create a number of bodies or coordinate with established entities to facilitate cooperation within the area of operations. The type of coordinating body is based on the particular situation and partner organizations required to solve

the problems. The three common types of coordination organizations are the Civil-military operations center (CMOC), the Humanitarian assistance coordination center (HACC), and the Embassy's country team. Though the country team is not established by the JFC, the JFC should leverage this important organization to assist in planning and execution of the JFC mission.

The CMOC is an improvised, tailor-able organization, created to coordinate actions of military forces with those of the nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, and other United States Government agencies.<sup>53</sup> Like the JIACG, the CMOC provides a forum where ideas and challenges can be identified and discussed. The CMOC also becomes the conduit in which requests for assistance by the nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations can be vetted.<sup>54</sup> Though the CMOC does not possess the authority to task units, it will forward those requests to the joint force headquarters. General A. C. Zinni stated "Instead of thinking about warfighting agencies like command and control, you create a political committee, a civil-military operations center — CMOC — to interface with volunteer organizations. These become the heart of your operations, as opposed to a combat or fire support operations center."<sup>55</sup>

During humanitarian assistance operations, the combatant command may establish a humanitarian assistance coordination center (HACC) to assist with international, interagency, and nongovernmental coordination. The mission of the HACC is similar to that of the CMOC but generally functions at the strategic level.<sup>56</sup> Like the CMOC and the JIACG, the HACC is a coordinating body with no authority to direct operations in the area.

The country team is the primary body for coordinating and implementing U. S. policy in a given country. Led by the Ambassador, the country team is composed of senior members from various United States Government organizations who coordinate plans, activities, and act as a

conduit of information between their parent agencies and the country team.<sup>57</sup> The country team is also responsible for developing and coordinating evacuation plans with NEO forces. During Operation *Eastern Exit*, the country team developed a plan for moving evacuees to the embassy compound, provided critical information requirements to the Marine Expeditionary Unit tasked with the evacuation, and synchronized the plans to enhance efficiency.<sup>58</sup> The evacuation incorporated more than just American citizens, forcing the country team to coordinate evacuation plans with citizens from multiple nations throughout Mogadishu. The cooperation and coordination demonstrated by the country team was essential in evacuating “281 people from 30 countries (including 8 Ambassadors and 39 Soviet citizens).”<sup>59</sup>

Regardless of the type of coordinating body, the critical element underlying synchronization is the liaisons that staff these centers. For the military, liaisons are tasked “to foster a better understanding of mission and tactics with other forces, facilitate transfer of vital information, enhance mutual trust, and develop an increased level of teamwork.”<sup>60</sup> To be able to accomplish this daunting task, liaisons must understand the capabilities and limitations of their organizations as well as the entities they are liaising with, and understand how these factors can affect the overall operations. According to Admiral P. D. Miller, “The necessary first step in shaping effective interagency groups is making known what skills and resources one brings to the table.”<sup>61</sup> The information gained about resources and capabilities must be maintained and updated for follow-on operations.

Liaisons also serve an important role in breaching cultural and language barriers.<sup>62</sup> These barriers can be between multiple nations or even multiple organizations within the same nation. United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) has taken the lead in incorporating interagency liaisons into the command structure by establishing an interagency directorate. The



J-9 is tasked with “spearheading the effort to harness the skills and expertise of our many interagency partners to address emerging challenges facing Central and South America and the Caribbean.”<sup>63</sup> Though USSOUTHCOM is not interagency itself due to Title 10 constraints, involving interagency experts into the planning, shaping, and execution of assigned missions facilitates communication and coordination. The next step could be integrating interagency members into the command structure as proposed by United States Africa Command’s Mr. James DeAngelis.<sup>64</sup>

### **Training and Education**

Though a clear command structure and established coordination centers are both essential to furthering unified action, the linchpin is the training and education of the people which serve in and interact with these systems. Admiral Stavridis acknowledged in the USSOUTHCOM’s Posture Statement, “Education and training are prerequisites to effective operations.”<sup>65</sup> The liaisons must possess the knowledge to inform all pertinent parties on the capabilities and limitations of relevant organizations. The free flow of knowledge is essential in coordination bodies such as the joint interagency coordination group, the civil-military operations center, or the country team. In Operation *Eastern Exit*, had the Ambassador and the JFC not been educated on the standard operating procedures and command relationships for NEOs, the results of the evacuation could have been very different.

Operational commanders must ensure that an educational process is in place to train all members of the command, interagency, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations and foreign partners on organizational capabilities and limitations. The methods used in the educational process should be tracked and evaluated for benefits and liabilities; with changes

made accordingly. Multiple methods are available to the operational commander, which include formal schooling, training, and war games and exercises.

Formal schooling refers to education received at any war college, domestic or foreign, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, or institutions sanctioned by the National Security Education Consortium. The consortium is “designed to better integrate non-DOD security professionals into a system of professional education and development.”<sup>66</sup> The educational institutions are critical in arming future liaisons with the knowledge needed to effectively support planning staffs and coordination centers. Inviting members of the interagency, coalition partners, and nongovernmental organization to these schools will enhance future operations by breaking cultural barriers, fostering mutual understanding, and building trust. The challenge with formal education is the “lack [of] sufficient manpower and [funding] to send adequate numbers of professionals to [these] educational experiences.”<sup>67</sup>

In many cases, individual and unit training is easier to leverage than formal schooling. Individual and unit training can be achieved with standard operating procedures, computer based training, and with language and cultural training. During Operation *Joint Endeavor*, the lack of common doctrine established by IFOR was a significant challenge overcome by “constant practice and determination.”<sup>68</sup> To overcome a similar challenge in the future, the land component commander asserted that IFOR would need to “invest in more joint training.”<sup>69</sup> With a plethora of professional military and governmental classes available on-line, computer based training has become an effective way in conducting personal training. Joint professional education, language, and even cultural awareness training can enhance the value of the individual to the command or agency.

Lastly, the use of war games and exercises are excellent methods of familiarizing personnel with the processes, interactions and decision points during a stressful but simulated environment. This environment can be modified as required to put personnel in different scenarios, requiring cooperation and coordination with multiple agencies or nations. This flexibility allows the commander to train on contingencies across the range of military operations with international, interagency, and even nongovernmental partners.

Currently, many nations around the world view war gaming as a method of promoting international cooperation by providing operational training, and enhance mutual understanding among the participating nations.<sup>70</sup> The Hexalateral War Game 07 incorporated representatives from Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Peru and the United States and focused on exploring command and control structures of a multi-national task force during a complex crisis.<sup>71</sup> The game was a perfect platform for exploring processes, socializing ideas and developing relationships with military officers from numerous regional partners.<sup>72</sup>

Unlike The Hexalateral War Game, *Hurricane Pam* was a planning exercise conducted by civilians at the Louisiana State Emergency Operations Center in Baton Rouge to develop joint disaster response plans in Louisiana.<sup>73</sup> The exercise incorporated participants from every level of the United States Government from federal to local. The exercise identified numerous problems and provided a platform for interagency interaction and the socialization of concepts. The training was successful for the lower levels of government but could have been maximized if the upper-echelon participants ensured the problems identified were addressed post exercise.<sup>74</sup>

## **Conclusion**

With military forces expected to conduct actions across the range of military operations, JFCs must understand the limitations of their authority over all activities in the area of operation.

Recognizing that multiple independent entities exist, attempts must be made to establish a unified purpose with organizations falling outside the commander's authority. The change from an authority-based command structure to an interest-based coordination construct can cause confusion, irritation, and distrust among the different parties making the goal of unified purpose difficult to achieve. To combat confusion, operational commanders must establish clear lines of authority to ensure all parties understand who is subject to integration and who requires synchronization to achieve unified action. If left unresolved, a nebulous command structure could evolve into stovepipes or barriers between unified commands and the consensus based organizations. This would needlessly limit the degree of unified action and increase the risk of mission failure.

To maximize unity-of-effort, the JFC must create coordination bodies, leverage existing synchronization entities, and incorporate governmental and nongovernmental representatives into the staff. Coordination bodies such as the joint interagency coordination group and the civil military operations center must be established to ensure information is exchanged so planners could eventually synchronize actions of military forces with all partner organizations in the region. If coordinating bodies already exist, the JFC must use liaisons to maximize the potential gains in coordination and cooperation. Additionally, JFCs must look at how they can encourage governmental and nongovernmental organizations to send representatives to the joint staff in hopes of integrating planning and synchronizing efforts.

In all cases, the coordinating bodies must be staffed by competent liaisons familiar with the capabilities and limitations of their organization and the organization they are liaising with. By positioning the right information into the process, the liaisons can enhance the situational awareness and increase the effectiveness of organizations. Additionally, liaisons provide a

medium for interaction which can enhance common understanding, promote relationships, and boost trust among associated organizations.

Education is also critical in the pursuit of unified action. Operational commanders need to ensure that a process is in place to educate all participants on effective methods of communication and coordination. The system should be designed to educate members of the interagency, partner nations, nongovernmental organizations and intergovernmental organizations. To retain organizational information, a comprehensive catalog of capabilities, limitations, and structure should be compiled. A capability catalog would be a valuable reference for all involved and could quickly educate new organizations in the region.

Finally, the use of schooling, training, war games and exercises are enablers to enhance mutual understanding and multi-lateral cooperation. Developing an education and training methodology within the joint force is critical to training liaisons, staff officers, and governmental and nongovernmental partners. The flexibility of these methods allows participants from across the spectrum of organizations to receive training in a variety of scenarios. This will form the basis for common understanding and help integrate or synchronize effects to achieve unified action. In the end, operational commanders must clearly align operational command structures, establish coordinating bodies and liaisons to synchronize the effects of different entities, and educate all partners on organizational capabilities and limitations, to ensure the United States Government achieves unified action in complex interagency and international operations.

### **Recommendations**

1. The JFC must establish clear lines of authority to ensure all parties understand who is subject to integration and who requires synchronization to achieve unified action.

2. The JFC must be proactive in establishing coordinating bodies such as the JIACG and CMOC, leveraging existing organizations, and establishing networks of liaisons to synchronize the effects of the different entities. Additionally, incorporating interagency, international, and nongovernmental liaisons into the joint force structure enhances coordination during planning, shaping, and execution of assigned missions.
3. The JFC must develop an internal training process for civil-military operations. The process must incorporate elements of formal schooling, individual training, war games and exercises to familiarize the participants with solving complex interagency and international problems. The training must be tailor able to integrate governmental and nongovernmental organizations, both foreign and domestic into planning and execution.
4. The JFC must create and maintain an organizational directory listing capabilities and limitations of interagency, international and nongovernmental organizations and coalition partners.

## Notes

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